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3 The failure of corporate governance 
and the limits of law: British banks 
and the global financial crisis 
ROMAN TOMASIC 
The global financial crisis demonstrated the fragility of the widely 
accepted faith in prevailing corporate governance ideas and the 
adequacy of legal mechanisms that were available to buttress these 
ideas. This was very evident from the fate of British banks after the 
failure of Northern Rock plc in late 2007 and the subsequent govern- 
ment action to rescue other leading British banks (Treasury Commit- 
tee, 2008h). After more than two decades of debate in regard to the 
improvement of corporate governance mechanisms in Britain, it 
became evident that many of the ideas that had been advanced during 
this debate have been found to he wanting and were in need of revision 
or even replacement; these earlier debates had largely sought to legiti- 
mize a self-regulatory approach to corporate governance and a mini- 
mal involvement of governments in markets. 
This corporate governance rhetoric can he traced back at least to the 
Cadbury Committee and subsequent inquiries which have helped to 
fashion the architecture of British corporate governance (Cadhurv, 
1992). These debates raised expectations in regard to the effectiveness 
of corporate governance codes, the monitoring roles of boards and 
especially of non-executive directors, the roles of institutional invest- 
ors, and the effectiveness of shareholders in being able to deal with 
major governance matters requiring attention (Greenhury, 1995; 
Myners, 2001; Higgs, 2003). The recent Walker Review of corporate 
governance in UK banks has sought to salvage many of these prevailing 
ideas by looking for best practice solutions to strengthen the largely 
self-regulatory corporate governance structures (Walker, 2009). 
This approach followed a broadly Anglo-American tradition of 
seeking to minimize the involvement of government in markets and 
led to the development of international movements to replicate this 
rhetoric in the fabric of international corporate governance structures; 
this is best illustrated in the development of the OECD's Principles of 
Corporate Governance and the replication of such codes widely 
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around the world (OECD, 1999; OECD 2004). The OECD has more 
recently also looked for best practice mechanisms to strengthen cor- 
porate governance in banking institutions (OECD, 2010). In many 
countries, and particularly in the UK with its Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (2006), the faith in these `soft law' corporate 
governance strategies was matched by a minimal development of legal 
rules, such as those regarding the issue of derivatives, and by a regula- 
tory approach to markets which accepted the prevailing orthodoxy 
that markets could best be left to regulate themselves. 
The effect of the minimal regulatory influence of the state over 
financial markets was amplified by the role of government in promot- 
ing London as a leading financial centre and in encouraging foreign 
banks and financial institutions to base themselves in this city because 
of the low level of legal intervention that could be expected. As a 
consequence, London attracted many of the riskier financial oper- 
ations of foreign firms such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, as well as 
securities fraudsters such as Bernard Madoff. ' The discussion of these 
other catastrophic failures is, however, beyond our scope here. 
This chapter will look at evidence that has emerged from the recent 
financial crisis regarding the weaknesses in prevailing corporate gov- 
ernance prescriptions; it will also examine failures in regard to legal 
mechanisms that had been seen as buttressing these largely private 
corporate governance ideas. It will focus mainly upon the UK, 
although similar findings could be made in regard to other markets, 
such as the United States and Germany (see further, Acharya et al., 
2009; Hopt, Kumpan and Steffek, 2009; Posner, 2009; Mulbert, 
2010). Unfortunately, there is insufficient space to deal with wider 
issues, such as the development of effective regulatory structures to 
deal with financial markets and the wider, largely politically driven, 
imperative to support London as a major financial centre. This is 
because an adequate treatment of these issues does, to a significant 
degree, require an international approach that is beyond the capacity 
of any one jurisdiction (see further, Treasury Committee, 2009d). 
The wider context of UK corporate governance 
To understand why it was possible for such catastrophic failures 
of major British banks to occur so suddenly it is useful to draw 
attention to the interweaving of three prevailing forces. First, the 
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ideological belief in the inherent superiority of self-regulation of 
financial markets was deeply entrenched in both the public and 
private sectors and undermined effective public oversight of markets. 
Secondly, the consequential belief that there was little, if any, need 
for government monitoring of these markets had the consequence 
that public legal institutions were either underdeveloped or under- 
mined. Thirdly, the political imperative to develop and maintain the 
position of London as a major financial centre meant that political 
pressure could also be brought to bear against intrusive regulations 
or regulators. 
There is no doubt that there are good arguments for all of these 
beliefs. It is also true that any effective corporate regulatory regime 
must depend heavily upon corporations being committed to maintain- 
ing appropriate governance standards and values as part of their 
corporate culture. It is clearly unrealistic to rely exclusively upon state 
intervention and monitoring in the regulation of complex financial 
markets; but this should not mean that government should retire from 
the field and merely act as a cheerleader on the sidelines of the 
marketplace. 
Alternatives to governmental regulation, such as the reliance upon 
private sector bodies, such as rating agencies, to evaluate the quality of 
financial products such as derivatives, face other problems, such as 
possible conflict of interest; indeed, it has been argued that rating 
agencies have played a significant role in generating the financial crisis 
(see further, Coffee, 2009). Similarly, professional gatekeepers have 
also failed effectively to restrain abuses in accounting practices (as we 
saw with the collapse of Enron) or to ensure that directors acted 
properly (see generally, Armour and McCahery, 2006). 
Professional gatekeepers (such as auditors and lawyers) have been 
seen as playing an important role in ensuring corporate integrity and 
their failure to prevent misconduct (often due to conflicts of interest) 
have undermined their effectiveness (see generally, Coffee, 2006; 
Fuchita and Litan, 2006; Dravis, 2007, pp. 125-46). Even internal 
corporate risk monitors within banks who were charged with the 
responsibility of risk assessment proved ineffective when faced with 
euphoric market situations and pressures from the sell side of banks. 
This was most graphically illustrated by the failure of Paul Moore in 
HBOS to effectively communicate the gravity of the risks that were 
being taken by the bank. 2 
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Finally, the political appeal of hosting a major financial centre needs 
to be balanced by the risks that excesses in such centres may lead to 
the need to impose heavy financial burdens on taxpayers who may be 
called upon to rescue failed financial institutions on the grounds that 
their survival was essential to the maintenance of stability in markets. 
Maintaining market stability and avoiding the spread of contagion 
from any failed financial institution are primary considerations in 
times of market crisis, so that emergency action taken to rescue failing 
institutions may often not be well thought through and may in due 
course be seen as being too irksome. For this reason, effective corpor- 
ate governance mechanisms cannot readily be constructed during 
crises, but crises do provide an opportunity to articulate more long- 
term solutions. This is because the evidence produced by such crises 
can be illuminating for corporate governance reformers. 
Recent failures in British banking 
The decade or so leading up to the failure of Northern Rock plc in late 
2007 had seen a massive transformation in the size and nature of 
British banking. Long-established building societies, like Northern 
Rock, had demutualized and set their sights upon rapid expansion; 
this was facilitated by the ready availability of substantial funds from 
foreign investors from as far afield as East Asia and the Middle East. 
Little consideration was given to the possibility that the availability of 
funds might suddenly dry up, as occurred in September 2007. 
In May 2009, the House of Commons Treasury Committee reviewed 
the failure of British banking since September 2007 and noted that as a 
result of the financial crisis: 
Five of the nine FTSE 100 banks in March 2007, Bradford & Bingley, 
HBOS, Lloyds TSB, Northern Rock and RBS, are now partly or wholly in 
public ownership. None of the four demutualised building societies, Alli- 
ance and Leicester, Bradford & Bingley, HBOS and Northern Rock, now 
exists as a stand-alone bank in its own right. Thousands of jobs in the 
financial services sector have been lost ... 
It is hard to estimate what will 
be the eventual cost to public funds of the banking crisis but the damage will 
be substantial and long-term. (Treasury Committee, 2009b, p. 7) 
But prior to September 2007, the ready availability of borrowed funds 
during these boom years meant that some banks, such as the Royal 
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Bank of Scotland (RBS), Northern Rock and HBOS, rapidly expanded 
to become significant national and international players. In the case of 
RBS, it was to become a major international player as a result of the 
ease with which funds could be borrowed; this expansion was largely 
achieved by resort to corporate takeovers (such as the ill-fated acqui- 
sition of Dutch bank ABN Amro in 2007 by RBS, Fortis and Santan- 
der; ) as well as to the development of new and more risky lines of 
business. 
This led to a change in the dominant business model that was used 
by these banks and financial institutions; in the case of a bank's 
mortgage business, instead of relying on the traditional `originate to 
hold' model, whereby banks would write mortgages and then hold 
these until lenders had paid their mortgages out, banks moved to an 
`originate to distribute' model in which they would repackage or 
securitize mortgages and often transfer these to off-shore special pur- 
pose vehicles that would then sell these securitized assets to investors. 
It was believed that the use of securitization was a way of limiting the 
risk faced by banks by taking these securitized products off their 
balance sheets by dispersing risk among other investors. But, as the 
FSA Chairman, Lord Turner, had observed, `Itihis analysis has proved 
wrong. Rather than improving system resilience, the development of 
securitised credit has ended up producing the worst financial crisis for 
a century' (Turner, 2009). 
The dangers presented by these new business models were not 
properly understood in view of the short-term horizons upon which 
prevailing risk models had been built (Taleb, 2007). The misplaced 
reliance upon faulty mathematical models also encouraged even 
greater risk-taking by issuers of new financial products Jett, 2009). 
Accentuating this risk-taking was the system of distorted incentives, 
such as large bonuses, which encouraged investment divisions of 
banks to develop and distribute new derivative products. The system 
of rewarding bankers by the payment of bonuses based on short-term 
performance often failed to have regard to long-term risks that were 
inherent in the products that had been sold by these banks (see further, 
Treasury Committee, 2009c). 
This conduct was built upon a conception of markets as ultimately 
being rational and efficient, assumptions that were found to be faulty; 
the concept of `irrational exuberance' has been used to characterize 
behaviour during market bubbles (Shiller, 2000; Fox, 2009). However, 
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despite the prevailing view of the inherent rationality of markets, some 
economists such as Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2005) had long known that financial markets were susceptible to 
crises during periods of speculative booms. But, as Richard Posner 
(2009, pp. 259-60) has argued, contrary voices such as these were 
often lost or submerged during the boom years due to the `overinvest- 
ment by economists, policymakers, and business leaders in a free- 
market ideology that opposes aggressive government interventions 
in the operations of the economy'. 
These ideologies were very influential in the UK where deregulatory 
and laissez-faire rhetoric was embraced with enthusiasm by both 
government and business. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown championed risk-taking and the `light touch' regulatory 
environment that London provided. On the eve of the collapse of 
financial markets in 2007, in addressing civic leaders and members 
of the financial community in London, Chancellor Brown confidently 
observed: 
Over the ten years that I have had the privilege of addressing you as 
Chancellor, I have been able year by year to record how the City of London 
has risen by your efforts, ingenuity and creativity to become a new world 
leader. Now today over 40 per cent of the world's foreign equities are traded 
here, more than New York: 
" over 30 per cent of the world's currency exchanges take place here, more 
than New York and Tokyo combined, 
" while New York and Tokyo are reliant mainly on their large American 
and Asian domestic markets, 80 per cent of our business is international, 
and 
" in a study last week of the top 50 financial cities, the City of London came 
first. 
So I congratulate you Lord Mayor and the City of London on these remark- 
able achievements, an era that history will record as the beginning of a new 
golden age for the City of London. 4 
This exuberant attitude had led the UK in 2002 to confer an 
honorary knighthood upon the former chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, Alan Greenspan, the architect of the low level of regulatory 
intervention in financial markets, for his `contribution to global 
economic stability'. 5 Two years later, the Chief Executive of the 
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Royal Bank of Scotland, Fred Goodwin, was also awarded a 
knighthood, although there were later calls for the removal of this 
knighthood following the collapse of RBS. 6 
More significantly, the UK had deliberately chosen an approach to 
market regulation that was `principles-based' and used `light-touch' 
regulatory methods. This model had been championed as a more 
effective response to the kinds of market abuses that had led to the 
passage in 2002 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States 
following the Enron and Worldcom failures. Critics have claimed 
that the superiority of the UK principles-based system of market 
regulation was not well founded (Kershaw, 2005). In contrast, the 
success of this strategy had been asserted by Chancellor Brown in 
his 2007 Mansion House speech, but the weakness of this strategy 
was soon evident after the Financial Services Authority sought 
to explain its failure to prevent the failure of Northern Rock. The 
FSA's internal audit presented a damning account of its failures as a 
regulator. ' 
The Treasury Committee of the House of Commons, when review- 
ing the failure of Northern Rock, was also critical of the failure 
of the tripartite regulatory authorities (consisting of the FSA, the Bank 
of England and the Treasury) to act quickly enough in the face of 
Northern Rock's difficulties in September 2007; these bodies also 
seemed to lack a clear leadership structure, although the Chancellor 
was said to be ultimately in control (Treasury Committee, 2008a, 
pp. 104-13). 
The FSA was subsequently to largely abandon exclusive reliance 
upon its `light-touch' and `principles-based' approach to regulation as 
being unsuitable in regard to financial markets as they had come to 
evolve in London. Instead, the FSA moved to what it was to call `the 
Intensive Supervisory Model'. Hector Sants, the FSA Chief Executive, 
explained the rationale for this model: 
Historically, the FSA characterised its approach as evidence-based, risk- 
based and principles-based. We remain, and must remain, evidence- and 
risk-based but the phrase `principles-based' has, I think, been misunder- 
stood. To suggest that we can operate on principles alone is illusory particu- 
larly because the policy-making framework does not allow it. Europe, in 
particular, has a particular penchant for rules and in any case in a number 
of key areas such as prudential regulation they are indeed necessary ... 
Furthermore, the limitations of a pure principles-based regime have to be 
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recognised. I continue to believe the majority of market participants are 
decent people; however, a principles-based approach does not work with 
individuals who have no principles. 8 
From the above it is clear that external corporate regulatory structures 
were poorly attuned to effectively monitoring `high impact' firms such as 
Northern Rock. UK laws were also poorly structured to deal effectively 
with failing banks, leading to a scramble to draft new special resolution 
regimes in an effort to rescue failing banks and to maintain market 
stability (see further, Tomasic, 2009b). In addition, it was recognized 
that other legal remedies, such as the company law obligations of direct- 
ors' provisions and shareholder rights' mechanisms were not adequate 
when dealing with financial crises such as that involving Northern Rock 
and other British banks (see further, Tomasic, 2009a; Tomasic, 2009c). 
This then leads us to look more closely at the internal corpo- 
rate governance structures within British banks. This was a matter 
that was touched upon in the January 2008 report of the Treasury 
Committee that looked into the run on Northern Rock, when criti- 
cisms were made of the lack of adequate banking qualifications of the 
Northern Rock Chairman and CEO. The Treasury Committee noted 
that the failure of Northern Rock was both a failure of the FSA as 
regulator as well as a failure of the Northern Rock board of directors 
(Treasury Committee, 2008a, pp. 33-4). 
It pursued these themes further in a number of reports in the following 
year (Treasury Committee, 2009a; Treasury Committee, 2009d). The 
theme of corporate governance failure was to be further pursued in the 
Committee's later reports and was taken up especially in the November 
2009 Walker Review into corporate governance in UK banks (Walker, 
2009). It is appropriate that we now turn to look more closely at some 
of these corporate governance issues. 
A case study: corporate governance failures 
in Northern Rock plc 
In many ways, the rise and fall of Northern Rock plc may be seen as 
reflecting many of the forces at work in the UK financial system in the 
lead up to, and in response to, the global financial crisis. 9 It was 
certainly not the biggest casualty of the crisis, as Royal Bank of 
Scotland and HBOS had greater financial difficulties. It was, however, 
the only bank to be fully nationalized by the UK Treasury, although 
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larger amounts of public money were allocated to the rescue of some 
of the other failing UK banks. 
Some UK banks, such as Barclays and HSBC, managed to avoid 
having to call upon the Treasury for funds to sustain them, '' but other 
banking names have now disappeared, such as Bradford & Bingley 
and Alliance and Leicester, which were acquired by the Spanish bank 
Santander and added to Santander's other British banking assets. 
Some major building societies, such as Scotland's largest building 
society, the 140-year-old Dunfermline Building Society, were absorbed 
by a larger domestic financial institution. " A recapitalized Northern 
Rock is also likely to be sold off as market conditions improve. 
Like many of the institutions that had struggled in the face of the 
global financial crisis, Northern Rock was a former mutual, having 
been set up as a building society in 1965 following the merger of two 
older building societies that had originally been established in 1850 
and 1865 respectively. ''` In 1965 the Northern Rock Building Society 
became the largest building society in Newcastle. It then grew rapidly, 
largely as a result of the acquisition of other building societies, and 
this saw its assets double to over £1 billion in 1983. 
After this time the building society set up a commercial finance 
division and moved into commercial lending. In 1994 it acquired the 
North of England Building Society, based in Sunderland; this was 
significant as it added 43,000 new borrowers and over £1.5 billion 
in assets, giving Northern Rock assets of over £10 billion and making 
it one of the top ten players in the industry. As one observer has noted: 
`[o]ver four years it had increased its size threefold, its profits fourfold 
and had halved its management expense ratios' (Walters, 2008, p. 6). 
In 1997 Northern Rock demutualized and became a listed public 
company; this allowed it to raise more capital from markets. '; All 
qualifying members of the mutual received 500 shares each and 
became shareholders in the new company. The business grew on the 
back of competitive pricing of its products and a narrow margin 
between what it paid for funds and the amount that mortgage bor- 
rowers paid it in interest. Although it was called a bank, Northern 
Rock did not offer a full range of banking services and tended to focus 
mainly upon residential and commercial mortgages and unsecured 
personal loans. In the first half of 2007 it wrote £10.7 billion in 
residential mortgages and this represented 18.9 per cent of UK net 
mortgage lending. 
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The bank's growth had not been funded by an expansion in its retail 
deposits but through reliance upon wholesale markets for interbank 
lending and by use of securitization (National Audit Office, 2009, 
p. 13). It had also not been greatly funded by equity capital-raising on 
the stock market. Nevertheless, by 2007 Northern Rock had become 
the fifth largest mortgage lender in the UK. However, it was under 
pressure due to its low levels of capitalization. It had almost the lowest 
level of market capitalization with only £4.8 billion in capital raised 
on stock markets on 2 April 2009.14 In contrast, the market capital- 
ization at that time of other leading UK banks was much higher: 
£31.6 billion for Lloyds-TSB, £39.30 billion for HBOS, £47.1 billion 
for Barclays, £62.8 billion for RBS and £103.1 billion for HSBC 
(Treasury Committee, 2009b, p. 7). 
In March 2007, Northern Rock was forced to sell its profitable com- 
mercial finance division as the new Base] II Accord, introduced earlier 
that year, had imposed higher capital adequacy requirements for com- 
mercial lending than for mortgage-based lending. In June this commer- 
cial finance business was eventually sold for £1.6 billion to Lehman 
Commercial Mortgage Conduit Limited - an affiliate of the American 
investment bank Lehman Brothers. In the meantime, interest rates con- 
tinued to rise; this was a problem for Northern Rock as it relied heavily 
upon borrowing funds from the money market at the interbank rate 
(LIBOR). This created a problem as most of Northern Rock's mortgage 
lending to its customers was tied to the Bank of England base rate, which 
was lower than the rate at which it sourced funds. 
This pressure caused Northern Rock to issue a profit warning to the 
London Stock Exchange at the end of June 2007. This led to a 12 per 
cent drop in the bank's share price or a 30 per cent drop in prices since 
February. At the same time Northern Rock received a Basle II waiver, 
which meant that only 15 per cent of its funds had to be available to 
support its residential mortgages. However, in a company that sourced 
75 per cent of its funds externally, this left Northern Rock `particu- 
larly exposed' due to the severe shortages of capital that it faced 
(Walters, 2008, p. 45). But the bank did not seem to be too concerned 
about this problem. 
This was characteristic of similar attitudes in other banks at this 
time, which continued to trade optimistically (see Treasury Commit- 
tee, 2009b, pp. 7-8). This extraordinary lack of restraint in the face of 
signs that the market was beginning to collapse was found in other 
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banks such as HBOS and RBS, which continued to do very risky deals, 
despite the warnings (Treasury Committee, 2009b, pp. 20-4). 
On 9 August 2007 interbank lending stopped suddenly due to 
fears that arose from an announcement by the French bank BNP 
Paribas that it would suspend three of its asset-based securities 
funds because of concerns that these could no longer be properly 
valued due to difficulties that were emerging in the US subprime 
mortgage market (Brummer, 2008, pp. 55-74). This followed hard 
on the heels of revelations of severe problems with three German banks 
on 2 August. 15 In one insider account from within Northern Rock: 
This announcement sent shock waves through an already sensitive market 
and it became evident to the board at Northern Rock that it would face 
severe problems if the markets were to stay frozen for long. The problems 
were especially severe for Northern Rock because its funding model 
required mortgage-backed securities and plain mortgages to be securitised, 
and its next securitisation was scheduled for September 2007. (Walters, 
2008, p. 53) 
The market freeze of 9 August 2007 was similarly described by one 
financial journalist: 
The events of Thursday, 9 August, had devastating consequences for North- 
ern Rock as it felt the full blast of the credit crunch. The bank's risk 
committee, headed by Sir Derek Wanless, had failed to act as a restraining 
force on the strategy of the executive members ... 
Now that the credit 
markets around the world, on which it depended for 75 per cent of its 
funding, were freezing up it found itself caught in a perfect squeeze, unable 
to fund the loans on its mortgage book, many of which had been sold too 
cheaply. (Brummer, 2008, p. 67) 
The senior officers of Northern Rock were also severely shocked by 
the multiple failures that occurred at this time. As the Commons 
Treasury Committee observed: 
Mr Applegarth [the CEO] told us that Northern Rock had wrongly `believed 
that high-quality assets and transparency [were] the way to maintain liquid- 
ity. ' Sir Derek Wanless [a non-executive director] told us that Northern 
Rock's `first line of defence [was] good credit quality ... 
Northern Rock 
had not foreseen all its funding markets closing simultaneously, as happened 
after 9 August ... 
The idea of all markets closing to Northern Rock was 
repeatedly characterised to us by Northern Rock officials as `unforeseeable'. 
(Treasury Committee, 2008, p. 16) 
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September did indeed prove a decisive moment for Northern Rock; on 
the 13th the Bank of England's emergency loan to Northern Rock 
was made public as a result of a leak to the BBC; this precipitated a 
bank run by Northern Rock depositors. As one financial journalist 
observed: 
Within minutes of the BBC bulletin, consumers began logging on to North- 
ern Rock's website and withdrawing their cash. The website then crashed, 
fuelling panic. The next morning, Northern Rock savers flocked to the 
bank's branch offices, and pictures of terrified savers in a long line in front 
of the bank beamed on to computers, television screens ... across the world. 
By mid-morning, a full-scale bank run was under way. (Tett, 2009, p. 229) 
The board of Northern Rock finally announced on 17 September that 
the Bank of England had given it a guarantee of 100 per cent of its 
deposits. A number of concerns had led the Bank of England to keep 
its support for Northern Rock secret as it examined legal issues 
connected with the provision of state support. Previously, the Bank 
of England had been reluctant to provide support to private banks 
because of arguments around the problems of moral hazard that had 
often been used to prevent government support for failing companies; 
these economic arguments were to be almost universally discarded as 
the financial crisis gathered momentum. 
The corporate governance problems facing Northern Rock were 
closely examined by the Treasury Committee of the UK House of 
Commons which concluded that: 
The directors of Northern Rock were the principal authors of the difficulties 
that the company faced since August 2007. It is right that members of the 
Board of Northern Rock have been replaced, though haphazardly, since the 
company became dependent on liquidity support from the Bank of England. 
The high-risk, reckless business strategy of Northern Rock, with its reliance 
on short- and medium-term wholesale funding and the absence of sufficient 
insurance and a failure to arrange standby facility or cover that risk, meant 
that it was unable to cope with the liquidity pressures placed upon it by the 
freezing of international capital markets in August 2007. 
The Treasury Committee went on to explain the nature of this gov- 
ernance failure when it added that: 
Given that the formulation of that strategy was a fundamental role of the 
Board of Northern Rock. overseen by some directors who had been there 
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since its demutualisation, the failure of that strategy must also be attributed 
to the Board. The non-executive members of the Board, and in particular the 
Chairman of the Board, the Chairman of the Risk Committee and the senior 
non-executive director, failed in the case of Northern Rock to ensure that it 
remained liquid as well as solvent, to provide against the risks that it was 
taking and to act as an effective restraining force on the strategy of the 
executive members. (Treasury Committee, 2008a, p. 19) 
In its response to these findings, the UK government agreed that the 
primary responsibility for minimizing risks and preventing other prob- 
lems lay with the bank's directors. Criticisms were levelled at a 
number of key features of its board; first, the chairman of the board 
(Dr Matt Ridley, a well-known scientist) was seen to lack appropriate 
experience and expertise to chair a major banking institution; 
secondly, the chief executive of the bank (Adam Applegarth) was 
criticized on a number of counts; thirdly, the board itself did not have 
significant levels of banking expertise; finally, its independent or non- 
executive directors seem to have failed to provide the kinds of checks 
and balances that it was said that such directors might provide to 
restrain an overly adventurous chief executive. Let us look at some of 
these concerns more closely (see further, Tomasic, 2008h, pp. 330-5). 
As we have seen, the House of Commons Treasury Committee laid 
responsibility for this failure to respond to the bank's changing risk 
situation squarely on the shoulders of its board) 6 The senior inde- 
pendent director of Northern Rock, Sir Ian Gibson, had argued before 
the Committee, in the board's defence, that it had sought advice from 
the FSA and the UK Listing Authority on the state of its business 
model; it also sought advice from its own legal advisors, and as a 
result the Northern Rock board was `fully satisfied that we did follow 
the best advice and followed] it to the letter' (Treasury Committee, 
2008a, p. 19). This confidence is in stark contrast to the subsequent 
findings of the Treasury Committee and many of those experts that it 
relied upon. '' Whether this effort to seek external advice is enough to 
satisfy the business judgment rule and principles of reliance is open to 
question. 
It is interesting to refer to wider reactions in the financial media to 
the patterns of behaviour at Northern Rock, which were apparently 
sanctioned by the Northern Rock board. This might help to better 
assess what would be seen as reasonable action on the part of the 
board. Some corporate governance authorities have accused the 
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Northern Rock board of lacking in due diligence. 18 Other comments 
have focused on the differing roles of executive and non-executive 
directors, as well as on the role and skills base of the bank chairman 
and its CEO. Writing generally about the difficulties facing board 
members, Paul Myners, at the time the City Minister and a former 
member of the UK Financial Reporting Council, stressed the increas- 
ing importance of corporate governance in regard to banks: 
Proposals to overhaul the banking system have largely ignored the gover- 
nance of our banks. But if other reforms are to have any traction, it is 
essential to shake up the boardrooms that oversee the rest of the operation. 
First, board members should never forget that the most vital part of their job 
is to challenge executives ... Are 
board members asking the right questions 
and with enough persistence? ... 
The business of banking is exponentially 
more complicated than a generation ago, and the panel (the board) guiding 
it must be able to follow its dealings. At the very least the chairman and 
senior independent director or chairman of the risk committee should have 
recent and relevant banking experience. (Myners, 2008, p. 15) 
In regard to non-executive directors, Ruth Sunderland, writing in The 
Observer, noted that: 
Northern Rock's downfall highlights persistent weaknesses in corporate 
governance, not just there but at other blue-chip companies. The indepen- 
dent directors, who are supposed to act as a check on executive folly, did not 
restrain Adam Applegarth, the chief executive, from his turbo-charged 
business model, which was a bit like putting a Ferrari engine into a Micra. 
Sunderland went on to ask why none of the non-executive directors 
`seems to have made the simple inquiry as to why a modest mortgage 
bank in Newcastle upon Tyne was playing at the casino end of the capital 
market'. 19 But Anthony Hilton, writing in September 2007, thought 
that the non-executive directors of Northern Rock were `not lightweight 
people' as they had considerable experience in the financial services 
industry and yet they either did not see the risks that the bank was 
running or, if they did, they were unable `to persuade the management 
to be more prudent'. He added that some non-executive directors may 
find it difficult to seek to restrain an overly zealous CEO who was at the 
same time being cheered on by the wider business community. `'' This 
was a point emphasized by Hilton when he wrote: `Adam Applegarth, 
the [Northern Rock] chief executive, was a much-admired man in 
the fund management community until last month. What chance do 
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non-executive directors have to rein him in when the entire fund man- 
agement community is on the other side urging him on? ' He added 
pointedly that `[w]e might conclude that the problem lies not in the 
quoted companies, but among the analysts and institutional sharehold- 
ers who in their thirst for rewards too often drive executives to those very 
excesses of risk which end in tears. '21 It could also be argued that the 
board may have been encouraged to have less to fear of the risks inherent 
in its business strategy because these risks were being securitized and then 
passed on to Granite, Northern Rock's special purpose vehicle. 
As it turned out, this was not as effective a way of avoiding these 
risks as they might have expected. In any event, it seems from the 
comments of independent director Sir Ian Gibson that the board 
would seek shelter in legal arguments to the effect that they acted 
reasonably and that they took advice from appropriate experts. How- 
ever, some courts have become increasingly uncomfortable with argu- 
ments upon reliance where directors might be expected to know better 
or to be more diligent. 22 
The old view of a director's standard of care and diligence, as 
expressed by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, 23 
has come to be criticized with the rise of community expectations 
concerning the qualities that directors should bring to the boardroom. 
In developing a standard of `reasonable care' to be followed by direct- 
ors, Romer j had drawn upon the discussion of the notion of reasonable 
care in the nineteenth-century decision in Overend & Gurney Co v. 
Gibb. This was, of course, a case involving a company that was at the 
heart of the last major run on a British bank (see further, Collins and 
Baker, 2003, pp. 86-91). In that case it was said: 
... whether or not the 
directors exceeded the powers entrusted to them, or 
whether if they did not so exceed their powers they were cognisant of circum- 
stances of such a character, so plain, so manifest, and so simple of appreci- 
ation, that no men with any ordinary degree of prudence, acting on their own 
behalf, would have entered into such a transaction as they entered into? 24 
This view of the notion of reasonable care has been echoed to some 
degree by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Daniels t/as 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells v. AWA Ltd. 2-S However, this Court went 
on to call for a higher standard of care than that propounded by 
Romer j and called for a more active engagement by directors in the 
scrutiny of company decisions. 
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Influenced by more objective standards for directors of companies 
facing insolvency, there has been a movement in some courts to 
adopt a more objective standard of care than was evident in earlier 
cases such as Re City Equitable. This may be illustrated by the view 
taken in the UK of the duty of care owed by a director. 26 For example, 
Professor Davies has noted: 
... the change over time 
in the type of person appointed to the board has 
also led to a shift of view within company law about the appropriate 
standard of care for directors ... 
The primary focus of the law's scrutiny 
is on whether the board took reasonable steps to inform itself before it took 
the decision in question and not on whether the substantive decision taken 
was reasonable. (Davies, 2002, pp. 155-7) 
In the Australian case of Daniels v. Anderson, the NSW Court of 
Appeal sought to go beyond early twentieth-century British case law 
and drew upon US authority to update legal principles derived from 
Britain on the extent to which directors could rely upon others when 
making decisions. 27 However, Northern Rock shareholders were not 
able to obtain much comfort from these developments as there 
remained some doubt in the UK that legal actions against its directors 
would be successful. 
Following its nationalization, on advice from their lawyers, the 
new controllers of Northern Rock therefore decided that there were 
insufficient legal grounds to pursue such an action against the former 
bank directors. 28 When Northern Rock shareholders subsequently 
sought compensation for the loss of their shares, as a consequence of 
the forced nationalization of the bank, their causes of action did not 
focus upon the duties of the directors of Northern Rock, but unsuc- 
cessfully relied largely on human rights grounds concerned with the 
unfair misappropriation of their property by government (see further, 
Tomasic, 2009c). 
In light of this discussion of evolving legal principles regarding 
the appropriate duties of directors, it is interesting to note the level 
of qualifications held by members of the board of Northern Rock; 
this had been discussed by the Commons Treasury Committee and 
has been the subject of pointed comments in the press. Although the 
chairman of Northern Rock's Risk Committee was seen as being `an 
extremely experienced banker', the report of the Treasury Committee 
found: 
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We are concerned that the Chief Executive of Northern Rock [Mr Adam 
Applegarth] was not a qualified banker, although of course he has signifi- 
cant experience. The Financial Services Authority should not have allowed 
nor even again allows two appointments of a Chairman and a Chief 
Executive to a `high-impact' financial institution where both candidates 
lack relevant financial qualifications; one indication that an individual has 
been exposed to the relevant training is an appropriate professional qualifi- 
cation. Absence of such a qualification should be a cause of concern. We 
therefore recommend that the FSA undertake an urgent review of the 
current qualifications of senior directors in financial firms ... 
(Treasury 
Committee, 2008, pp. 33-4) 
The qualifications of the former chairman of Northern Rock, Dr Matt 
Ridley, also did not escape comment; it was noted in the Financial 
Times that he was a zoologist and a successful science writer (Myners, 
2008, p. 15). He had joined the board of Northern Rock in 1994 and 
then served as non-executive chairman from 2004 until 2007; he 
resigned after being criticized in Parliament for harming the reputa- 
tion of British banking and for lacking financial experience. 29 His 
aristocrat father (Viscount Ridley) had previously been chairman 
of the bank from 1987 to 1992 and had sat on the board for three 
decades. It is not a strong defence for the board to say that the FSA 
had sanctioned actions taken by Northern Rock, especially when 
one reads the heavy criticism of the role of the FSA in this collapse 
that was made in the House of Commons (Treasury Committee, 
2008, p. 34). 
However, industry leaders since the time of Walter Bagehot (1873) 
have for some time called for the adoption of a higher standard of care 
than that which UK courts have been prepared to articulate; the 
judicial view was that it was the responsibility of Parliament to state 
any higher duty of care and not the courts. For example, in more 
recent times, Sir Adrian Cadbury, writing about the role of the chair- 
man of a public listed company, highlighted the rise in expectations of 
directors that has occurred and went on to point to the need for the 
training of directors; he pointed to paragraph A. 2.1 of the then UK 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance which stated that `every 
director should receive appropriate training on the first occasion that he 
or she is appointed to the board of a listed company, and subsequently 
as necessary' (Cadbury, 2002, p. 24). Cadbury went on to discuss risk 
management and the role of the hoard in this regard and noted that: 
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A key point is that companies are continually having to adjust their plans 
and strategies in the light of a changing competitive environment and thus 
the risks they face, and the priorities to be assigned to them, are continually 
changing as well ... 
It is for boards to set internal control policies and to 
assure themselves that they are working as they should. It is the job of 
management to put those policies into effect. (Cadbury, 2002, p. 220) 
Interestingly, the government-appointed Walker Review was also to 
criticize the standards of directors and called for amendments of the 
Combined Code to require them to be more actively involved in 
monitoring company matters. Walker, however, refrained from seeking 
to express this higher standard in legislative form, preferring the 
voluntary `comply or explain' model that had prevailed for some time. 
In the context in which domineering CEOs were able to influence 
boards to adopt excessively risky strategies, Walker called into ques- 
tion patterns of behaviour on British bank boards and noted that: `The 
most critical need is for an environment in which effective challenge of 
the executive is expected and achieved in the boardroom before deci- 
sions are taken on major risk and strategic issues' (Walker, 2009, p. 12). 
Walker's preferred solution was to strengthen corporate governance 
mechanisms that were already in place because of the fact that many 
corporate governance problems were `organic, dynamic and behav- 
ioural' and better dealt with by non-legal mechanisms (Walker, 2009, 
p. 28). This view is only partly correct, as there is much scholarly 
research to show that sole reliance on private regulatory enforcement 
alone will fail to secure improved regulatory objectives (see generally, 
McBarnet et al., 2007; Braithwaite, 2008). 
In any event, Walker focused on making improvements, such as in the 
composition of the board, obtaining greater time commitment by non- 
executive directors to their board duties, seeking a more active involve- 
ment of the chairman, increased board-level engagement in risk oversight 
and greater involvement of shareholders (and especially institutional 
shareholders) in discharging their responsibilities as owners. This has 
led the UK Financial Reporting Council to draft a Stewardship Code and 
to review provisions of the former Combined Code of Corporate Gov- 
ernance (see further FRC 2009; FRC 2010). The key question here will 
be whether these `soft law' solutions will be sufficient. 
It is too early to say whether such corporate governance changes are 
likely to prevent the collapse of another leading banking institution. 
The collapse of Northern Rock clearly highlighted major deficiencies 
68 Roman Tomasic 
in the internal and external regulation of British banks and identified 
corporate governance issues as being important reasons for this fail- 
ure. The academic literature would suggest that there is more room for 
improvement than that identified in the Walker Review. But the fact 
that the FSA has become more active in regulating British banks and 
financial institutions is a major departure from earlier patterns of 
governmental regulation of this sector. 
Some conclusions 
The failure of so many British banks during the global financial crisis 
has highlighted the centrality of corporate governance issues. These 
have widely been perceived to have been important in explaining why 
banks failed to respond to the risks that were to cause them to fail. In 
part, this failure has been attributable to an uncritical adherence to 
market self-regulation; in this context it was widely considered that 
soft-law codes of corporate governance were more effective than 
legislation or government regulatory action. To some degree this view 
has been echoed in the academic literature, which has pointed to the 
limits of law and the centrality of corporate culture in explaining 
corporate conduct (see further, Stone, 1975). 
Although formal legal rules and government regulation alone have 
limitations in being able to ensure corporate accountability, the simple 
pursuit of self-regulatory or soft-law mechanisms is not adequate 
either. This has been demonstrated by recent events, where the virtual 
withdrawal of government action in fostering improved corporate 
governance has undermined the operation of self-regulatory strategies 
in British banks. It is clear that there is room for a range of mechan- 
isms in achieving better corporate governance. 
The failure of British banking regulation during the recent finan- 
cial crisis calls for a more thoroughgoing review of existing corpor- 
ate governance mechanisms. This applies both within banks and to 
bank boards in particular. It also calls for more effective external 
monitoring and control of corporate governance failures. Simply 
tinkering with the self-regulatory `comply or explain' approach and 
renaming the Combined Code, are unlikely to be effective, especially 
in periods of market euphoria or booms. A history of successive 
bank and other corporate failures has demonstrated this lesson. 
As evident in the above discussion, the well-documented events 
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surrounding the failure of British banks such as Northern Rock, RBS 
and HBOS, to mention but a few, call for a more radical review of 
prevailing corporate governance and self-regulatory strategies than 
has occurred to date. 
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